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Understanding Eurasian Convergence: Application Of Kohonen  
Self-Organizing Maps 
 
Joel I. Deichmann Abdolreza Eshghi Dominique Haughton 
       Selin Sayek  Nicholas Teebagy        Heikki Topi 
 
Data Analytics Research Team, Bentley College 
 
 
Kohonen self-organizing maps (SOMs) are employed to examine economic and social convergence of 
Eurasian countries based on a set of twenty-eight socio-economic measures. A core of European Union 
states is identified that provides a benchmark against which convergence of post-socialist transition 
economies may be judged. The Central European Visegrád countries and Baltics show the greatest 
economic convergence to Western Europe, while other states form clusters that lag behind. Initial 
conditions on the social dimension can either facilitate or constrain economic convergence, as discovered 
in Central Europe vis-à-vis the Central Asian Republics. Disquiet in the convergence literature is resolved 
by providing an analysis of the Eurasian states over time. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The definition of what constitutes the entity of 
Europe   is   debated   widely  (Almström,  2000;  
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Jordan,  2002).   In   particular,   no   satisfactory 
physiographic barriers exist to distinguish 
Europe from neighboring Asia. Many scholars 
approximate the border as the Ural Mountains, 
the Volga River, or the Bosporus Strait, dividing 
Russia and Turkey between Europe and Asia 
(Jordan, 2002). Others conveniently define 
Europe according to the membership of the 
fifteen EU member states, but this definition 
leaves out Norway, Switzerland, and several 
wealthy micro-states, as well as (until 2004) the 
Central European candidate states. Jordan 
(2002) defined Europe in terms of the people 
who live there, identifying the cultural traits that 
define the source of Western civilization, in 
addition to ten secondary socio-economic 
characteristics that most European states share.  
The collapse of the Soviet empire in 
1989, coupled with the deepening and widening 
debate within the EU, has fueled an 
unprecedented movement toward a unified 
Europe. The post-socialist countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe have embarked upon a 
daunting task of instituting a series of dramatic 
economic and social reforms to create western-
style market economies with the objective of 
becoming full-fledged members of the EU as 
quickly as possible. As noted by the Economic 
Analysis Division of the United Nations 
Economic Commission for Europe: 
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One of the strategic goals of the transition 
economies is to achieve sustained and 
high rates of economic growth that would 
enable them to catch up with – to 
converge upon – the living standards of 
the developed economies of Western 
Europe. And many of them regard EU 
membership as instrumental to promote 
this process. (United Nations Economic 
Commission for Europe, 2000) 
 
In their efforts to join the EU, Central 
and Eastern European countries have opted for a 
wide variety of transition paths to treat their 
unique set of initial conditions, in turn leading to 
a correspondingly heterogeneous set of results. 
While some have either regained (e.g., Poland, 
Slovakia, and Slovenia) or are close to regaining 
(Czech Republic and Hungary) their pre-
transition GDP levels, others (notably Georgia, 
Ukraine, and Moldova) continue to struggle with 
their transformational recession (United Nations 
Economic Commission for Europe, 2000). 
The question of post-socialist 
convergence has been the subject of extensive 
scholarly research from various perspectives 
(see Szalkowski & Jankowicz, 1999; Genov, 
1998; Bartlett, 1997; Brabant, 1998; Lang, 2003; 
Graham & Hart, 1999, to name just a few). 
However, there is no consensus on the extent of 
convergence and the factors that have led to 
highly heterogeneous outcomes. The research 
presented here is intended to address these issues 
by analyzing a comprehensive set of socio-
economic variables for all of the Western 
European and post-Communist countries for 
which data are available. 
More specifically, the purpose of this 
article is to map the progress of post-socialist 
countries in catching up with, or converging 
upon the advanced Western European 
economies over the past decade. In particular, 
not only is the overall convergence mapped, but 
the macroeconomic, social, and institutional 
factors that are responsible for the convergence, 
or lack thereof, are identified. In this context, the 
role played by economic factors versus social 
factors in catching up and converging with the 
EU is discussed. A secondary purpose of this 
research is to extend previous Kohonen analysis 
on transition economies (Deichmann et al., 
2003) to include the existing EU members plus 
Norway, Switzerland, the USA (see note 1 in 
Fig.9), and Turkey. In so doing, it is hoped that 
the extent to which this broader group of 
Eurasian states clusters geographically when all 
reference to location is absent will be 
determined, and use the changes in the clusters 
over time to observe whether or not patterns of 
convergence exist among these groups of 
economies.  
 
Post-Socialist Heterogeneity 
A significant body of literature has 
documented the differential levels of 
convergence throughout Eurasia during the first 
ten years after the Iron Curtain fell. Using data 
through 1998, Estrin, Urga, and Lazarova (2001) 
examine average (GDP) growth rates for 
transition economies leading up to and following 
the abrupt changes that began in the early 1990s. 
Focusing upon twenty-six countries over twenty-
seven years, the level of pre-transition 
convergence was examined since 1991. Among 
the twenty-six states, they found that Hungary, 
Poland, Slovenia, Estonia, and Armenia are the 
only states with positive average growth rates 
since the transition and only Armenia, Slovenia, 
and Hungary have sustained growth that might 
eventually allow their economies to catch up 
with those of Western Europe. 
Also citing disparities in growth prior to 
the 1990s transition, the authors highlight the 
failure of reallocation mechanisms within the 
Soviet bloc, with the possible exception of the 
former Yugoslavia, which was only loosely 
affiliated with Moscow. They concluded that the 
failure of Soviet-led central planning to 
ameliorate regional disparities within the 
socialist bloc is likely to have facilitated the 
demise of supranational affiliations within the 
region. Unfortunately, the authors also find little 
evidence for convergence during the first decade 
of individual state policies.  
Kočenda (2001) modeled the time-path 
of several macroeconomic variables to evaluate 
convergence of Central European and Baltic 
states. Variables under investigation include 
industrial output, prices, money (capital), and 
interest rates. Among these countries, there are 
dramatically differing initial conditions that 
favor the Czech Republic and its neighbors, 
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while putting the Baltic states at a comparative 
disadvantage; for example, the former enjoy an 
earlier 1989 starting point, while the latter 
became independent in 1991 and have only 
recently introduced their own new currencies. 
Despite the countries’ unique initial conditions, 
Kočenda (2001) found considerable evidence of 
convergence by these otherwise similar 
countries through the natural process of 
increased international trade and through the 
institutional processes of coordination to satisfy 
EU pre-accession requirements. However, Kutan 
and Yigit (2004) emphasized the importance of 
model specification and how it changes the 
results of Kočenda (2001). They showed that 
when heterogeneity is taken into account the 
within-group convergence is not as evident as 
suggested by Kočenda.  
Brada and Kutan (2001) examined the 
extent of convergence of monetary policy of EU 
candidate and non-candidate transition states to 
the German monetary policy, which is viewed to 
be broadly representative of the European 
Central Bank. They concluded that the transition 
states (both candidate and non-candidate) lag far 
behind the non-transition EU candidates 
(Cyprus, Malta, and Turkey), revealing deeply 
rooted disadvantages of central planning that 
endure in transition countries. They contended 
that Hungary and Poland, which have pursued 
independent monetary policies throughout the 
1990s, have the best prospects of converging to 
EU fiscal policies.  
Brada, Kutan, and Zhou (2002) 
employed a rolling cointegration technique to 
evaluate the convergence of base money, 
broader money (M2), the consumer price index 
(CPI), and industrial output in five leading EU 
candidate countries: the Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia. Brada 
et al. (2002) argue that adequate convergence 
has yet to occur in the areas of monetary policy 
and industrial output, but that consumer prices 
and M2 are comparable to those in the EU, 
confirming earlier findings (Brada & Kutan, 
2001) with a wider frame of inquiry. They 
concluded that considerable time will be 
necessary following accession and before the 
candidates join the Euro zone.  
 Wagner and Hlouskova (2001) focused 
on convergence in the real (vis-à-vis nominal) 
dimension, mainly economic growth. In doing 
so, they study the correlation between the initial 
level of GDP of ten Central and Eastern 
European economies and their average growth 
rates over the 1990s and find evidence for 
convergence only after 1998. They applied the 
distributional dynamics technique, formulating a 
statistical model to describe the evolution of the 
joint distribution of real per capita GDP of the 
CEE and EU economies. This method allows for 
the investigation of the mobility of each 
economy within the cross country income 
distribution over time. They concluded that their 
evidence reveals high persistence in the data 
combined with a low probability of an economy 
changing its location in the distribution. 
Therefore, neither of their methods suggested 
evidence of convergence among the CEE and 
EU economies through 1998. 
 
Theoretical Explanation 
The issue of heterogeneity in economic 
convergence among post-socialist countries can 
be explained with reference to a number of 
theoretical and conceptual arguments. First, 
theoretical models in development economics 
(Barro & Sala-i Martin, 1992) posited that 
economies with low initial GDP levels should 
grow faster than those with higher initial GDP 
levels, and eventually catch up with these more 
developed economies. This is certainly the case 
among post-socialist countries. These countries 
began the journey toward a free-market 
economy with varying initial economic 
conditions.  
A second explanation was offered by 
Romer (1986) who argued that the 
characteristics inherent in technology prevent 
convergence from occurring because increasing 
returns to scale cause the rich countries to 
become richer while the poor countries fall 
further behind. A related argument is that 
convergence will only occur among countries 
with a well-developed human capital base, 
which allows for such countries to benefit from 
modern technology. 
Third, Barro (1991) and Barro and Sala-
i Martin (1992) suggested that absolute 
convergence does not exist as all countries have 
different long-run per capita income levels that 
prevent such convergence. However, they 
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showed that each country converges to these 
differing long-run equilibria, and they labeled 
this phenomenon as conditional convergence. 
Fourth, Sachs and Warner (1995) argued 
that unconditional convergence depends upon 
the policy choices of the respective economies, 
and that countries that pursue market-based 
economic policies, liberal trade policies, and 
respect private property rights show strong 
tendencies to convergence. Sachs and Warner 
(1995) found that the transition economies that 
have undertaken significant economic reforms 
show convergence signs to the European Union, 
while those that have not converged show 
persistence in their economic position.  
Fifth, the specific manner of 
implementing economic reforms is also believed 
to be responsible for heterogeneous patterns of 
convergence. Some countries opted primarily for 
a top-down approach by privatizing the state-
owned enterprises, whereas others (mainly the 
Central and Eastern European economies) 
generally favored a bottom-up approach by 
encouraging the establishment of new start-up 
enterprises and development of existing private 
firms (Brezinski & Fritsch, 1996; Woo, 1998). 
Ellman (1997) argued that experience from the 
past decade demonstrates that the development 
of new private firms is more important for the 
resumption of economic growth than is rapid 
privatization. 
Another factor that may have influenced 
the convergence outcome is the pace at which 
reforms were implemented. Some countries 
implemented drastic macroeconomic 
stabilization policies known as the shock therapy 
approach, whereas others insisted upon a policy 
of gradualism, which entails structural and 
institutional reforms as a pre-condition to 
introducing macroeconomic stabilization 
reforms (Popov, 2000). 
Finally and perhaps most importantly, 
the success of economic and social reforms is 
not only contingent upon their contents but upon 
the social and historical context in which they 
are implemented (Rosenbaum, 2001). In other 
words, market reforms presuppose societal 
values and norms that are consistent with 
democracy and a free-market economy. Some 
post-socialist countries have been more 
successful in implementing market reforms due 
to their historical and cultural ties with Western 
Europe. Rosenbaum’s (2001) review of the 
economic history of Central and Eastern Europe 
indicates that the development of a secular civil 
society in Western and Central Europe resulted 
from conflict between the state and the princes 
on the one hand and the church on the other. 
Consequently, the intellectuals gained the 
opportunity to play off competing authorities 
against one another, giving rise to new 
philosophical and political ideas that led to the 
overthrow of the autocratic and feudal order and 
relegated the church to just one of many interest 
groups. By contrast, the church and the political 
authority remained in one hand in the East under 
Orthodoxy, which tended to block 
individualistic tendencies and the introduction of 
new ideas such as private property. 
As also noted in Rosenbaum (2001, p. 
895), whereas Christianized Poles, Czechs, and 
Hungarians adopted the institutional order of the 
West and became part of Western culture, 
Russia and much of the Balkan region remained 
insulated from the infusion of new ideas, leading 
to consolidation of power in the hands of the 
state. As a consequence, Orthodox cultures tend 
to accept the dominant role of the state in society 
and economy as fait accompli. Clearly, the 
historical experiences of post-socialist countries 
have far reaching implications for the role of the 
individual in determining her/his economic 
destiny. In short, when the historical and cultural 
experiences are consistent with free market 
values and norms, substantial progress toward 
convergence is observed over a relatively short 
period of time. However, when there is a 
mismatch between the historical and cultural 
experiences and the free market values and 
norms, the transition is likely to be slow and 
painful.  
 
Methodology 
 
Kohonen Self-organizing maps were used 
(SOMs) to examine post-socialist convergence 
in Eurasian countries. Kohonen maps were 
pioneered during the 1980s and have been used 
as a method of visualizing non-spatial data 
(Kohonen, 1982). Techniques for creating and 
interpreting Kohonen maps have been refined 
and reviewed by their namesake in a series of 
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subsequent volume editions (Kohonen, 2001). 
SOMs have been employed in many contexts, 
for example in mapping non-geographic data 
ranging from text documents (Kohonen, 1999) 
to conference abstracts (Skupin, 2002; 
Kloptchenko et al., 2003).  
The application of Kohonen maps 
continues to grow in a variety of disciplines 
(Deboeck, 1998; Oja & Kaski, 1999). One 
application that is particularly relevant here is 
the work of Costea, Kloptchenko, and Back 
(1998). They compared the relative advantages 
of SOMs and cluster analysis in evaluating the 
economic status of six transition economies: 
Russia, Ukraine, Romania, Poland, Slovenia, 
and Latvia. They introduced a very insightful 
way of depicting statistical trends in data over 
time: each observation corresponds to a country 
at a specific point in time, which facilitated a 
clear understanding of how countries migrate 
across the map over time.  
 
The Kohonen Algorithm 
The Kohonen algorithm can be briefly 
described as follows (see for example Kaski and 
Kohonen 1996): the algorithm assigns to each 
position i in a grid an arbitrary (random) vector 
)0(im with as many components as input 
variables. At each time t the vector of variables 
x(t) corresponding to one of the observations 
updates the current vectors )(tmi  according to 
the formula 
))()()(()()1( tmtxthtmtm iciii −+=+ , where 
||)(||minarg ii mxc −= and )(thij is a 
function of t and of the geometric distance on 
the lattice between position i and position j. 
Typically 0→ijh  with increasing distance 
between i and j and increasing time. So the 
vector x(t) is allowed to update the vector )(tmc  
it is closest to as well as some neighboring 
vectors )(tmi . When the algorithm converges, 
the im  tend to be ordered along the lattice in a 
meaningful way (see note 2 in Fig. 9). 
 
Data Issues 
Due to data restrictions, the analysis is 
limited to the period 1992-2000. The breakups 
of      the     Soviet    Union,    Yugoslavia,     and 
Czechoslovakia all resulted in missing values for 
the resulting new states during the early years of 
our analysis. These were addressed by entering 
the unions’ values for each state (for example, 
the Czech Republic and Slovakia were both 
assigned the 1992 value for Czechoslovakia). 
After that point, any missing entries were 
replaced with the value estimated by regressing 
each variable on time for each country. Finally, 
many missing values for the year 2001 limited 
the analysis to the years through 2000.  
 
Description of Variables 
Procuring accurate, complete, and 
current socioeconomic data for the transition 
states is a formidable challenge (Costea, 
Kloptchenko, & Back, 2001). Most of the data 
were collected by national authorities and 
reported by the World Bank Development 
Indicators CD-ROM (2002) for the years 1992-
2000.  
The list of variables under consideration 
is presented in Table 1. The variables include 
economic, social, and political measures. The 
measures were chosen to capture each country’s 
preconditions as well as subsequent measures 
(both absolute numbers and rates of change). 
The economic variables can be sub-grouped into 
real and nominal variables. The real variables 
encompass indicators of economic development, 
the role of government and fiscal policy in the 
economy, the level of physical infrastructure, the 
depth of financial markets, and international 
openness measures. The nominal variables 
include indicators regarding the domestic price 
of goods and the foreign currency price of the 
domestic currency, the inflation rate and the real 
exchange rate respectively, and the real interest 
rates. Explicit reform variables, as addressed by 
Sach and Warner (1995), are available only for 
transition states, and are therefore unsuitable for 
this analysis that spans the EU and other wealthy 
states as well.  
 The social infrastructure measures, 
which include variables that impact the 
development    of    human    capital,    such     as 
education and health measures, are covered in 
the social dimension of the analysis. In addition 
to such social infrastructure measures several 
physical infrastructure measures are also 
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included in this group, as they also contribute 
more to the development of social infrastructure  
than anything else. These measures include 
efficiency in electricity distribution and access 
to communication means such as telephone and 
the internet. Finally, the social indicators also 
include measures of extent of political rights and 
civil liberties. 
 
Analysis 
As in Costea, Kloptchenko, and Back 
(2001), all countries under investigation for each 
individual year are first plotted on a single map 
to monitor movements over time throughout the 
lattice on the basis of all available variables. The 
variables are then subdivided into social/political 
and economic measures in an effort to examine 
the role they play in convergence. 
 
 
Analysis of Aggregate Maps 
Figure 1 represents a self-organizing 
map of all country-year pairs (such as Moldova 
1992, for example) over 1992-2000, constructed 
on the basis of all variables in Table 1 for all 
countries under investigation. The largest group 
of countries can be thought of as a European 
core—composed of mainly EU states located in 
the center-top of the figure (such as France, 
Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, the UK). Outside this core, several 
noteworthy peripheries exist,   in    addition   to 
several   distinct   groups   of   laggard transition 
countries. As was observed in past work (Kaski 
& Kohonen, 1996; Deichmann et al., 2003), an 
 
TABLE 1. LIST OF ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND POLITICAL VARIABLES 
 
Variable Description 
Prscgdp Private sector credit as share of GDP 
Electricyt Electric power transmission and distribution losses 
Kgdp Gross capital formation as share of GDP 
Infl Inflation (GDP deflator based) 
Growth Real GDP per capita growth  
Tradegdp Trade as a share of GDP 
Figdp FDI as a share of GDP 
Reserves Reserves, months of import coverage 
Cagdp Current account balance as a share of GDP 
Gdppc GDP per capita (in real 1995 USD) 
Fiscgdp Overall fiscal balance including grants (share of GDP) 
Rer Real exchange rate 
Rir Real interest rate 
Bankresliq Bank reserves to liquid assets 
Tellines Telephone lines (per 1000) 
Stuteach Student to teacher ratio 
Schoolenroll Secondary school enrollment (gross) 
Immunmeasl Immunization against measles 
Lifeexp Life expectancy 
Nodoctors Number of physicians (per 1000) 
Immunization Immunization against DPT 
Agedepend Age dependency ratio (dependents to working-age population) 
Healthpub Public health expenditures (share of GDP) 
Healthpr Private health expenditures (share of GDP) 
Healthsum Total health expenditures (share of GDP) 
Internet Internet users as share of population 
Civlib Score for civil liberties (1=lowest, 7=highest)* 
Polrights Score for political rights (1=lowest, 7= highest)* 
 
Data Source: World Bank (2002) except for *, which were obtained from Freedom House (2003) 
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outstanding feature of this first U-matrix is the 
preservation  of  many  geographic  relationships 
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FIGURE 1. U-MATRIX OF COUNTRY MOVEMENTS FROM 1992-2000. 
Note: See http://tbf.coe.wayne.edu/jmasm for map in color. 
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in the absence of explicitly geographic variables. 
This is clearly the case in Figure 1 and in 
subsequent figures.  
Figure 2 provides estimated (by the 
Kohonen algorithm) values of the input 
variables at each grid position in the U-matrix. 
For example, it may be seen that estimated 
values of private health expenditures are high at 
the US (for all years) map position (top left of 
the U- matrix). Note that the U-matrix, in 
addition   to   actual   grid   positions,     includes 
slots      between      grid positions which are 
colored to represent how close the grid positions 
are to one another. The color on an actual grid 
position  represents  how  close the position is to     
 
 
its neighbors. For example, it is known that the 
positions of Switzerland and the US (at the top 
left of the map) are very close in terms of 
estimated variable values because the hexagon 
between them is dark blue (very light grey in 
grey scale format). Conversely, it may be seen 
that the position occupied by Croatia 92/93    
and   Latvia   93 (about two thirds of the way 
down on the left of the map),   is   distant   from    
its neighbors because it is colored orange (a 
large distance color, as indicated by the color 
legend), dark grey in grey scale format. 
A study of Figure 2 yields an 
interpretation - presented on Figure 3 – of the 
vertical and horizontal dimensions on the map. 
Together, the visual tools presented in Figures 1- 
3 facilitate an overall impression of how the 
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FIGURE 2. COMPONENT MAP OF ALL SOCIOECONOMIC VARIABLES 
Note: See http://tbf.coe.wayne.edu/jmasm for map in color. 
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countries  have  fared since 1992 based upon the 
aggregate set of variables. Although these maps 
are useful for facilitating a holistic view of 
multifaceted convergence, they are cumbersome 
because they include a very complex set of 
social and economic variables. Accordingly, an 
analysis of the patterns in detail is not included 
at this point because they are more efficiently 
and effectively discussed in the next sections as 
distinct social and economic dimensions. 
Instead, Figure 3 is provided as an overarching 
summary of the main movements of clusters 
observed in the aggregate U-matrix. From this 
diagram, it may be asserted that there exists 
some evidence of positive change throughout 
Europe. Whether the transition states are indeed 
converging with the west or simply maintaining 
positions/falling behind is an issue that is best 
addressed with specific reference to the 
identified dimensions.  
In an effort to glean a more explicit 
understanding of the dimensions/axes 
interpreted in Figure 3, the variables are now 
subdivided into (mainly) social and economic 
sub-sets. From these new maps, one may then 
glean clearer insights on the nature of the 
SOMs’ axes, as well as the extent of 
convergence along these axes for all Eurasian 
states in the sample.   
 
Analysis of Social Clusters and Dimensions 
In order to evaluate social convergence, 
this method first identifies clusters of stable 
states, and then examines movement among 
clusters and individual states. Figure 4 provides 
a U-Matrix constructed on the basis of social 
variables only -infrastructure, health indicators, 
and political freedom measures, estimated 
values of which are shown individually in Figure 
5. The U-matrix makes it possible to identify 
several groups, and ultimately combined with an 
inspection of Figure 5, to identify consistent 
dimensions and evaluate the degree of 
convergence over time.   
Several groups are identified from 
Figure 4: a European Core including regionally 
cohesive sub-groups, the USA, and a former 
USSR-core state group including Russia, 
Belarus, and Ukraine. Outside of these groups, 
very little cohesion exists, and large distances 
separate each state, most of which tend to move 
quite substantially over time, with the exception 
of Turkey, Tajikistan, Armenia, and Albania.   
The largest and most cohesive cluster in 
Figure 4 is the European Core. This includes 
most of the EU plus, at its edges, the Visegrád 
states (Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, and 
Slovakia), and the Baltics (Estonia, Latvia, and 
Lithuania). This clustering of EU states with EU 
candidates is remarkable, underscoring 
longstanding social similarities that underlie 
recent economic differences. The clustering 
together of these states based upon several social 
variables lends credence to the argument that the 
Visegrád and Baltic states (formerly of the 
Warsaw Pact) are truly Western European on a 
social development level, while also supporting 
cultural assertions by Rosenbaum (2001).  
Within the European Core, separated by 
sporadic yellow (grey in grey scale format) cells, 
three somewhat discrete clusters exist: first, a 
southern/central group (Italy, Greece, Austria, 
Germany). This group of welfare states is 
distinguished by a high number of doctors per 
1000 population. On this specific measure the 
EU is similar to the group comprised of Russia, 
Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan (see 
Healthpub in Figure 5) where extensive public 
health services were extended to the population, 
a legacy of central planning in the Soviet core 
area. Second, a recent (late 1990s) Scandinavian 
group can be identified, distinguished by high 
levels of internet use, fewer doctors, more 
teachers, and higher school enrollment levels. 
Finally, Ireland stands alone throughout much of 
the decade, but is joined by Spain and Belgium 
in recent years. Separating these countries from 
the rest of Europe are larger school classes and 
much lower immunization rates. The USA is at 
the top of the social map, but clearly distinct 
from Europe. Again, by examining Healthpub in 
Figure 5, one may see how U-matrix positions 
can be attributed to an extreme estimated score 
on a specific variable, in this case the diminutive 
role of government in American healthcare. In 
association with US isolation on the left side of 
the U-matrix, this set of observations provides 
considerable insight for defining the overarching 
horizontal dimension as individual responsibility 
(left) versus government welfare (right).  
 
 
UNDERSTANDING EURASIAN CONVERGENCE 82 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   Political Justice and Social Well-being 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Lux, N 
          EU Core 
Switz
USA 
 EU Periph 
S&P 
2000 
Visegrád    
2000 
  Baltics 
  Balkans 
Alb 
CAS 
Euro Reps ’92-‘93 
-FORMER USSR- 
Asian Reps ’92-‘95 
Turkey 
I,B, 
Ind. 
Aust 
Ire 
Russia, 
Ukraine, 
Belarus 
   Visegrád  
   ‘91-‘95 
Shaded Areas= Considerable physical, political, 
cultural, or economic barriers to interaction with EU. 
Direction of movement over time: 
Kohonen “wall” of major distinction:  
France FRG 
Fin 
  Slovenia and 
Croatia’92-‘98  
Slov 
Eco
n
o
m
ic
 Integ
ratio
n
 
E
co
n
o
m
ic
 Isolatio
n/S
elf
-S
ufficien
cy
 
Authoritarianism and Social Limitation 
N 
Key 
FRG= Germany 
Fin= Finland 
Lux= Luxembourg 
N= Netherlands 
S&P= Spain & Portugal 
EU Periph= S&P, Greece 
I=Italy 
B=Belgium 
Ind. Aust= Pre EU Austria 
Ire= Ireland 
Visegrád= CZ, H, SK, P. 
Slov= Slovenia 
Baltics= Est, Lat, Lith 
Balkans= Bul, Rom, Mold 
CAS= Central Asian States 
Alb= Albania 
 
 
 
FIGURE 3. ABSTRACTED DIAGRAM OF GROUPS BASED ON FIGURE 1 
Note: See http://tbf.coe.wayne.edu/jmasm for map in color. 
 
DEICHMANN, ESHGHI, HAUGHTON, SAYEK, TEEBAGY, & TOPI 
 
83 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.426
1.13
1.84
 
 
 
 
 
US92
US93
US94
US95
US96
US97
US98
US99
US00
Greece96
Greece97
Greece98
Greece99
Greece00
Italy92
Greece93
Italy93
Greece94
Italy94
Greece95
Italy95
Italy96
Italy97
Italy98
Italy99
Italy00
Austria92
Greece92
Austria93
Austria94
Austria95
Germany92
Germany93
Germany94
Germany95
Germany96
Germany97
Germany98
Germany99
Spain92
Belgium98
Ireland99
Belgium00
Ireland00
Ireland92
Ireland93
Ireland94
Ireland95
Ireland96
Belgium97
Ireland97
Ireland98
Armenia92
Armenia93
Armenia94
Armenia95
Armenia96
Armenia97
Armenia98
Armenia99
Armenia00
Turkey92
Turkey93
Turkey94
Turkey95
Turkey96
Turkey97
Turkey98
Turkey99
Turkey00
Azerbaijan93
Tajikistan92
Tajikistan93
Tajikistan94
Tajikistan95
Tajikistan96
Tajikistan97
Tajikistan98
Tajikistan99
Tajikistan00
France92
Belgium93
Belgium94
Belgium96
Spain93
Croatia92
Croatia93
Croatia94
Croatia95
Croatia96
Croatia97
Croatia98
Croatia99
Moldova00
Latvia94
Latvia95
Latvia96
Azerbaijan92
Moldova93
Turkmenistan92
Turkmenistan93
Switzerland92
Switzerland93
Switzerland94
Switzerland95
Switzerland96
Switzerland97
Switzerland98
Switzerland99
Germany00
Switzerland00
Austria96
France93
France94
Belgium95
France95
France96
France97
France98
Belgium99
France99
France00
Netherlands93
Spain96
Spain94
Spain95
Croatia00
Moldova96
Moldova97
Estonia93
Lithuania94
Moldova94
Estonia95
Estonia92
Latvia93
Estonia94
Moldova95
Russia95
Kazakhstan92
Moldova92
Russia92
Kazakhstan93
Russia93
Kazakhstan94
KyrgyzR92
KyrgyzR93
KyrgyzR94
Turkmenistan94
Turkmenistan95
Turkmenistan96
Turkmenistan97
Turkmenistan98
Turkmenistan99
Denmark93
Belgium92
Denmark92
Denmark94
Netherlands94
Denmark95
Denmark96
Netherlands92
Finland92
Norway92
Finland93
Norway93
Finland94
Norway94
Norway95
UK92
UK93
UK94
UK95
UK96
UK97
UK98
Luxembourg92
Luxembourg93
Luxembourg94
Slovenia97
Slovenia92
Slovenia93
Slovenia94
CzechR93
CzechR94
CzechR95
CzechR96
CzechR97
Belarus92
Lithuania92
Ukraine92
Russia94
Russia96
Russia97
Azerbaijan94
Turkmenistan00
Sweden92
Sweden93
Sweden94
Netherlands95
Sweden95
Netherlands96
Sweden96
Denmark97
Netherlands97
Netherlands98
Portugal99
Austria97
Austria98
Spain98
Spain99
Spain97
Slovenia96
Slovenia98
Slovenia99
Slovenia95
CzechR98
CzechR99
CzechR00
SlovakR98
SlovakR99
SlovakR93
SlovakR94
SlovakR95
SlovakR96
SlovakR97
Belarus93
Ukraine93
Belarus94
Ukraine94
Belarus95
Ukraine95
Russia98
Russia99
Russia00 Belarus96
Belarus97
Belarus98
Belarus99
Belarus00
Kazakhstan95
Kazakhstan96
Kazakhstan97
Kazakhstan98
Kazakhstan99
Kazakhstan00
Azerbaijan95
Azerbaijan96
Azerbaijan97
Azerbaijan98
Azerbaijan99
Azerbaijan00
Denmark98
Netherlands99
Netherlands00
Portugal00
Finland95
Finland96
Austria99
Spain00
Slovenia00
Estonia98
Poland99
Estonia97
SlovakR00
Lithuania98
Lithuania99
Lithuania00
Bulgaria92
CzechR92
Slovak
Ukraine96
Ukraine97
Moldova98
Moldova99
Ukraine00
KyrgyzR95
KyrgyzR96
KyrgyzR97
KyrgyzR98
KyrgyzR99
KyrgyzR00
Sweden97
Sweden98
Denmark99
Norway99
Sweden99
Denmark00
Norway00
Sweden00Norway97
Finland98
Norway98
Finland99
UK99
Finland00
UK00
Norway96
Finland97
Austria00
Estonia00
Luxembourg95
Luxembourg96
Luxembourg97
Luxembourg98
Luxembourg99
Luxembourg00
Estonia99
Hungary00
Portugal92
Portugal93
Portugal94
Portugal95
Portugal96
Hungary97
Portugal97
Hungary98
Portugal98
Hungary99
Poland00
Hungary92
Hungary93
Hungary94
Hungary95
Hungary96
Poland98
Poland92
Poland93
Poland94
Poland95
Estonia96
Poland96
Latvia97
Poland97
Latvia98
Latvia99
Latvia00Bulgaria93
Lithuania96
Lithuania97
Latvia92
Lithuania93
Bulgaria94
Bulgaria95
Lithuania95
Bulgaria96
Bulgaria97
Romania97
Bulgaria98
Romania98
Bulgaria99
Romania99
Bulgaria00
Romania00Ukraine98Ukraine99
Romania92
Romania93
Romania94
Romania95
Romania96
Albania92
Albania93
Albania94
Albania95
Albania96
Albania97
Albania98
Albania99
Albania00
 
 
FIGURE 4. U-MATRIX BASED ON SOCIAL INDICATORS 
Note: See http://tbf.coe.wayne.edu/jmasm for map in color. 
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Several countries remain either 
completely or virtually stable between 1992 and 
2000. Sharing few commonalities other than the 
fact that most of them are not EU-Core, these 
countries include Switzerland, the USA (our 
benchmark), Ireland, Turkey, Tajikistan, 
Albania, and Armenia. Several noteworthy 
differences were revealed by the estimated 
variables. First, the position of the US is clearly 
a result of high private versus public health 
expenditures, the only social variables in which 
the US varies notably from the European Core.  
 
 
 This means that although Americans on 
average enjoy a comparatively high standard of 
living, they are unique in how much they pay for 
healthcare. Second, Ireland has fewer teachers 
and doctors per thousand, and its infrastructure 
lags behind the European Core. Third, Turkey is 
isolated from the European Core by low scores 
on healthcare and education variables, as well as 
by civil liberties and political rights measures. 
Fourth, Albania’s stability is based upon high 
scores on democracy, which conflict with 
inadequate infrastructure (electricity losses) and  
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FIGURE 5. COMPONENT MAPS OF CONTRIBUTING SOCIAL VARIABLES 
Note: See http://tbf.coe.wayne.edu/jmasm for map in color. 
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poor estimated healthcare and education. 
Finally, Tajikistan seems to confirm the nature 
of the horizontal dimension with its high level of 
age dependency (Figure 5), which draws it to the 
left side of Figure 4.  In drawing this conclusion, 
it is assumed that birth rates in Tajikistan are 
higher partially in response to an absence of 
state social security systems. 
Given the aforementioned observations, 
the horizontal (left-right) dimension is 
interpreted as a continuum of social 
individualism vis-à-vis social welfare as 
exemplified by the relatively less individualistic 
European Core. Further, the quality of life 
variables (life expectancy, infrastructure, 
education, medical care, and political rights) 
along the vertical dimension lead us to conclude 
that the quality of life increases as one moves 
from the bottom to the top of the map (Figure 6). 
 
Convergence on the Social Dimensions  
Overall, the U-matrix of social variables 
(Figure 4) indicates relatively less movement 
than that which is found later on the economic 
map (Figure 7). This means that little evidence 
exists for convergence in the social dimension. 
In order to understand the movements in the 
map, both the component maps (Figure 5) and 
the original data file were consulted for dramatic 
changes in variable values. The largest jump and 
convergence to Western Europe occurs in 
Estonia. Although its starting point is similar to 
that of Latvia, it converges much faster to 
Europe and by the end of the decade groups 
together with the periphery European countries 
such as Portugal. Portugal in turn moves from 
center-right to top-center during the final two 
years of analysis due to a major improvement in  
 
 
school enrollment, internet use, and public 
health expenditures during these years.  
Another major movement is that of 
Germany and Austria, which move from center-
left to top-center in 2000. Austria’s improved 
quality of live appears to be driven by an 
estimated increase in immunizations, internet 
use, and doctors, corresponding to the dates 
following its own EU accession in 1995. 
Similarly, Figure 5 hints that Germany’s 
improvement is due to increased internet use, 
measles immunizations, and public health 
expenditures. This observation confirms a move 
toward a larger welfare state in Germany, which 
is in line with Germany’s mid-1990s election of 
a Red-Green alliance government led by Social 
Democrats.  
All of the Visegrád states witness an 
increase in the quality of life dimension during 
the final three to four years. Like Germany 
under the Social Democrats, these fledgling 
democracies appear to be moving toward the top 
right, more toward the model of a European 
welfare state than the individualistic model of 
the USA or Switzerland. As an example, the 
Czech Republic enjoyed improvements since 
1997 in nearly all social indicators (except 
school enrollments and immunizations); these 
changes were faster than the average changes 
and suggest evidence of social convergence, 
especially in internet use, public and private 
health expenditures, availability of doctors, and 
quality of infrastructure.  
Finland and Norway move from the top-
center to the top-right, indicating again a recent 
improvement in the quality of life, as well as a 
modest increase in the role of government. This 
movement  appears  to  be  driven primarily by a  
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FIGURE 6. INTERPRETATION OF SOCIAL DIMENSIONS 
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large increase in estimated internet penetration, 
and an increase in the estimated number of 
doctors. Several states outside of the European 
Core show a very gradual horizontal move, but 
little or no vertical move. One such country is 
Turkmenistan, showing a gradual sign of 
improvement in political rights with no change 
in its quality of life dimension. Azerbaijan and 
the Kyrgyz Republic show movements similar to 
Turkmenistan in the political rights dimension; 
however, this improvement is accompanied by a 
worsening in the quality of life for both 
countries. Ukraine and Bulgaria show no 
evidence of social convergence to the European 
Core, but both show some modest positive 
changes on the political rights dimension.  
Other countries show no change in the 
role of government dimension but indicate 
significant movements in the quality of life 
dimension. For example, Romania’s sheer 
vertical move indicates improvements in quality 
of life since 1997. Similarly, Moldova shows no 
sign of change in its role of government, but it 
converges to the European criteria in the quality 
of life dimension, approaching Slovakia and 
Croatia. Kazakhstan contrasts with Moldova, 
showing deterioration in quality of life over 
time, while political rights have improved. 
Belarus shows signs of similar worsening in 
quality of life, with very slight improvements in 
political rights (similar to Kazakhstan). 
Three countries — Russia, Latvia, and 
Lithuania — move along multiple dimensions. 
Russia has a very gradual increase in the quality 
of life, providing some evidence of convergence, 
accompanied by gradual improvements in the 
political and civil rights. Lithuania also shows 
similar positive movements, with signs of 
convergence to Western Europe. Latvia shows a 
more  volatile  pattern  over  the  decade,  but the  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
end point is very similar to that of Lithuania. 
They retreat on both dimensions in 1993, but 
their recovery in 1996 results in net convergence 
to Western Europe over the decade.  
To summarize the maps of social 
indicators, the European Core and its multiple 
fringes clearly corresponds to slight variations 
on Western Civilization (Rosenbaum, 2001; 
Jordan, 2002). For example, a Scandinavian 
cluster of welfare states seems to define the 
epicenter, surrounded by a Germanic cluster 
(Germany, Austria, Switzerland), a French 
cluster (France, Belgium), and a group that 
encompasses the Central European leading 
transition states (Visegrád and Baltics); this 
cluster is in slight contrast to the United States, 
which shares a high quality of life, but 
prescribes a smaller role for government. When 
considering these and other examples, 
considerable stability exists in the social 
dimensions, indicating that little convergence 
has occurred. It is likely that the convergence 
that has occurred in the region hearkens back to 
cultural linkages that preceded the superficial 
division of Europe by the Iron Curtain. 
 
Analysis of Economic Clusters and Dimensions 
On the basis of the earlier review of the 
literature (Rosenbaum, 2001), it is expected that 
economic change can be readily achieved if 
deeply-rooted cultural and societal values are in 
place. In an effort to confirm this expectation, 
Figure 7 was constructed using variables that 
represent only the economic measures of the 
states for comparison with Figure 4. The 
economic U-matrix includes a combination of 
absolute indicators and change indicators (such 
as inflation and growth), as well as domestic 
measures (GDP per capita, reserves) versus 
measures of international linkages (FDI, trade). 
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FIGURE 7. U-MATRIX BASED ON ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
Note: See http://tbf.coe.wayne.edu/jmasm for map in color. 
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In many ways, this U-Matrix is more 
complex than the U-Matrix of social indicators. 
First, there is considerably more movement 
among the countries over time. Second, 
relatively more barriers exist that distinguish 
groups from one another, challenging the notion 
of a cohesive European Core group based upon 
economic characteristics. The more nebulous 
nature of this map is likely attributable to the 
fact that two of the economic variables are 
measures of rates of change (inflation, growth). 
At a basic level, a European Core exists, 
made up of large EU countries and the US. 
These are all wealthy countries with plenty of 
capital—both public and private. Several 
wealthy, integrated countries with core locations 
(and geographically close to one another) remain 
stable throughout the entire period. These 
include Luxembourg, Belgium, Switzerland, 
Germany, and Austria. Within this core, a sub-
group of countries can be identified in the upper-
right that experienced exceptional growth at 
very specific time periods; examples include 
Ireland 98-2000 and Sweden 98-2000. Ireland’s 
recent growth is widely attributed to relatively 
inexpensive, well-trained, English speaking 
labor force and targeted government policies, 
and the significant foreign direct investment 
these advantages attracted (see, e.g., Trauth, 
2000; 2002). 
The transition states are much more 
volatile on the economic map than on the map of 
social dimensions. This is unsurprising, as the 
lifestyles of Europeans, as established on the 
basis of the social map, are more homogeneous 
than their economic characteristics. Greece 
remains fairly stable in the bottom portion of 
this economic group of peripheral Southern 
Europe, which is periodically joined by shock-
therapy Poland (1992-95), some unstable and 
rapidly changing former Soviet Republics 
including    Ukraine   1999-2000 and   
Kazakhstan  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2000, as well as Turkey (whose growth efforts 
are often derailed by economic crises, with 
correspondingly volatile economic growth) and 
Albania, which shows rapid change throughout 
the 1990s in response to far-reaching reforms.  
Only a faint barrier distinguishes 
Europe’s core (EU plus Switzerland and USA, 
minus Spain, Portugal, and Greece) from the 
transition states (which include the EU’s 
periphery). This lack of clear distinction is 
attributed to the fact that there is a mixed bag of 
absolute and relative/change variables. In 
interpreting the patterns in Figure 7 on the basis 
of the specific variables in Figure 8, it may be 
seen that Europe’s core has good initial 
conditions but has experienced less growth and 
fewer effects of reforms (in particular, growth, 
real GDP per capita growth).  
In contrast to the Core, most transition 
states had worse initial conditions but have 
experienced more dramatic growth because of 
their reforms. As expected, it was found that 
slow starters converge faster (e.g., Albania, 
which features some of the worst initial 
conditions, but is propelled toward the top of 
Figure 7 by its growth rate throughout the 
nineties). The position of Turkey, which by 
comparison was much better off in 1992, 
remains closer to the bottom partially because of 
more modest changes since that time and 
constrained by the real effects of economic 
crises. These observations corroborate Barro and 
Sala-i Martin’s (1992) assertion that high growth 
rates can be more easily achieved in economies 
with less advantageous initial conditions. The 
nature of economic variables therefore further 
complicates the position of each state, and in 
interpreting states’ positions close attention 
should be paid to whether each measure is 
absolute (e.g., real exchange rate, real interest 
rate) or an indication of change (e.g., growth, 
inflation).  
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Convergence on the Economic Dimensions 
Movement of countries—both from left 
to right and from bottom to top—provide 
evidence of migration to where the EU core 
rests, namely at the upper-right corner of the 
map. The EU core itself moves in this direction 
over time, as indicated in particular by the 
movements of the Scandinavian states plus 
Holland and Ireland. In this northeastwardly 
direction,    the    United    States    and   United  
 
 
 
Kingdom move toward the top, with the same 
relative distance between them, and Italy moves 
toward the Core by itself. Note however the 
stability of Belgium and Luxembourg over the 
same period. 
The Caucasus, Baltics, and Turkestan 
(see note 3 in Fig.9) all cover substantial space 
(even crossing red and yellow cells – very dark 
and dark cells in grey scale format) during 
the first few years of the 1990s. This migration 
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FIGURE 8. COMPONENT MAPS OF ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
Note: See http://tbf.coe.wayne.edu/jmasm for map in color. 
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represents a movement away from historical 
USSR-oriented trade and toward truly globally 
integrated trade and investment, which 
reinforces our interpretation of openness being 
both on the left and on the right side of the map. 
Among these states, the most profound moves 
are in the case of Tajikistan, which had been 
firmly lodged in the Soviet sphere of influence 
at the outset of our study (Figure 7), but 
approaches the Central European success stories 
by 2000.  
France is a notable exception to the 
overarching upward trend, moving slightly 
toward the bottom and left. Similarly, the Czech 
Republic moves slightly toward the bottom, 
which is probably indicative of the difficult 
fiscal conditions during the late 1990s, 
corroborated by evidence in the component map 
that points to a shortage of capital. The Czechs 
responded by looking to FDI to treat their 
current account deficit since 2000.  
Hungary, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania 
demonstrate the greatest convergence among the 
sixteen transition economies in the data, both 
horizontally toward the right and vertically 
toward the top. Underscoring this substantial 
move across Figure 7 is the fact that these states 
cross a yellowish color (grey in grey scale 
format) barrier toward Europe, indicating a 
significant decline in economic distance. Among 
these four, Hungary is the lone state with a right-
side starting point from which it moved 
vertically upwards. The three Baltic countries 
show a significant movement away from the 
other former European Soviet Republics that are 
concentrated in the lower-left corner.  
The remaining countries show either 
extremely modest convergence or considerable 
volatility over time. Tajikistan and Kazakhstan 
show the largest vertical move in this group of 
eight. Specifically, they move in a mostly 
northeastward direction, incorporating the 
convergence features of both the horizontal and 
the vertical move. Belarus and Ukraine can be 
grouped together, moving mainly toward the top 
and right until the late 1990s when the direction 
seems to shift to the left. This is interpreted as a 
slowdown in their trajectories of convergence, 
but it could also be brought on by embracing 
foreign trade and investment. Armenia, 
Azerbaijian, Moldova, and Turkmenistan are 
propelled   by   increasing  GDP  per  capita  and  
 
growth rates, declining inflation, deeper 
financial markets, and improved fiscal balances. 
Moldova seems to have made a late move of 
convergence after 1998 when it separated from 
the others in this group. While some progress is 
evident, this cluster seems to have converged 
least among the Eurasian states.  
The remaining states show considerable 
volatility. The Kyrgyz Republic demonstrates 
some of the most volatile movement among 
transition states, moving to the top and right in 
1993-94 and then falling back in 1995, only to 
jump toward the top again in 2000. Given a lack 
of data to support this jump the sustainability 
and the evidence for a continuing convergence is 
not very clear at this point. 
Distinct from the Kyrgyz Republic, but 
similar in volatility, Turkey and Bulgaria also 
show considerable circularity in their 
movements. Turkey is very unique in that it 
seems to complete a full circle in its move over 
the past decade. It finishes the decade at its 
starting point; the 1994 crisis pushes Turkey off 
the convergence path (toward the bottom of 
Figure 7) and the recovery brings Turkey back 
to its initial point with no further evidence for 
convergence through the end-point of the 
analysis. While it shows similar circularity 
during the 1990s, Bulgaria seems to have 
converged to Europe much more than Turkey. 
Romania shows more of a horizontal 
move to the right, especially in the latter part of 
the decade. It also converges toward the EU 
Core significantly in 1994 before retreating 
again. This observation notwithstanding, 
Romania seems to be much more open to 
international goods and capital flows after this 
period. Finally, Russia’s most dramatic period of 
convergence was 1997 toward the top and right, 
but following its 1998 economic crisis it 
returned to its approximate initial level. Russia’s 
leftward movement can also be interpreted as a 
change toward integration, which lies in marked 
contrast to Russia’s historical policy of autarky 
(self-sufficiency).  
Taking into account the aforementioned 
movements and subsequent investigation of the 
component  variables  and data set,  Figure  9  is  
DEICHMANN, ESHGHI, HAUGHTON, SAYEK, TEEBAGY, & TOPI 
 
91 
 
 
presented as a conceptual simplification of the 
economic dimensions. 
As in Figure 6, the labels are based upon 
the variables that have distinct top/bottom or 
left/right trends in Figure 8. For example, 
according to the measure of trade as a share of 
GDP in Figure 8, the countries on the right and 
on the left of the map clearly trade more than 
those in the middle, and the same holds true for 
FDI as a percentage of GDP; this signifies open 
(integrated) economies on both the left and the 
right side of Figure 7. Moreover, bank reserves, 
reserves, income levels, current account 
balances and private sector credit all tend to 
indicate that the top/bottom dimension 
represents a continuum of capital 
abundance/capital scarcity. 
The meaning of the horizontal axis is 
less clear than the vertical axis. The right side 
seems to represent greater capital account 
openness because FDI as a share of GDP is 
higher from left to right. But the openness story 
is less clear when one considers trade as a share 
of GDP. In any case, the horizontal move seems 
to capture some of positive aspects of the 
vertical move as well, because lower inflation is 
evident when one moves toward the right (and 
top). Similarly, growth and GDP per capita, FDI 
as a share of GDP, all increase in that direction, 
and the fiscal balances improves toward the top  
 
 
and right. This interpretation could suggest that 
a move toward the right represents a stage in 
convergence; however, the full convergence 
occurs if the horizontal move is combined with 
the vertical move.  
Along these lines, Wagner and 
Hlouskova (2001) also differentiate between 
convergence and loosely-speaking convergence, 
where the latter captures convergence in the 
economic structure of the countries involved on 
account of strengthened linkages via trade and 
foreign direct investment.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This article demonstrates the utility of Kohonen 
maps for visualizing Eurasian convergence over 
time (1992-2000) on the basis of 28 
socioeconomic measures. It contributes to the 
literature by identifying and explaining the 
relative movements of states on a two-
dimensional map, concurrently taking into 
account a large number of measures. In past 
work, measures had to be considered 
individually when discussing convergence, 
which explains why past work has to a certain 
extent led to sometimes conflicting conclusions. 
This analysis, thus, sheds some light on this 
debate. 
 
Capital rich- abundant private credit, liquid assets 
Economic stability 
 
↨ 
 
Integration (established)        Autarky/      Integration (recent) 
“Self-sufficiency” 
↨ 
Capital poor: Scarce public and private capital 
Stagnant transition (low growth, high inflation) 
 
 
FIGURE 9. INTERPRETATION OF ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS 
 
1 The USA is included in the analysis as a point of reference. 
2 To build our Kohonen maps, we used Matlab code (Laboratory of Computer and Information Science at the 
Helsinki University of Technology), available at www.cis.hut.fi/projects/somtoolbox/. 
3Turkestan is the supranational physiographic and cultural region that includes Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, 
Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan—all former Soviet Socialist Republics in Central Asia 
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In addition to the overall analysis that 
included the aggregate set of variables, the 
economic and social variables were analyzed 
separately. The resulting maps demonstrate 
several differences between the economic and 
social convergence processes. On one hand, the 
social variables seem to capture more stable 
traits of states than economic variables. 
Interestingly, the 2004 newcomers to the 
European Union are clearly clustered with most 
of the rest of the EU in the analysis of social 
variables, suggesting deeper cultural 
commonalities between these groups of states.  
Nevertheless, there is clearer evidence 
to support economic convergence than social 
convergence. It is believed that this is because 
initial conditions vary, which is particularly 
evident in the Visegrád states and the Baltics, 
and to a lesser degree Russia, the other European 
former Soviet Republics, and the Balkans. This 
supports the argument regarding the effects of 
historical and cultural linkages presented by 
Rosenbaum (2001). This regional gradient of 
European-ness corresponds to the notion of 
Brussels distance introduced by Fisher, Sahay, 
and Végh (1998). Conversely, states that are 
culturally distant from Western Europe (such as 
Central Asian Republics or the region known as 
Turkestan) exhibit less economic convergence.  
The main dimensions identified in the 
analysis suggest major higher-level constructs 
that can be used in interpretation of the results 
and potentially also in future research. In the 
overall analysis, the two major dimensions were 
the level of political justice and social well-
being and the extent of economic integration. In 
the more detailed analyses, the dimensions of 
the social map were related to the quality of life 
and the respective roles of governments and 
individuals in providing social welfare. Finally, 
the analysis of the economic variables led to the 
identification of two dimensions related to the 
timing of economic integration and the 
availability of capital. Future research should 
use multiple methods to analyze the relevance of 
these constructs as well as specific policy 
reforms.  
Methodologically this study 
demonstrates the usefulness of Kohonen maps to 
visualize large numbers of variables and 
complex sets of data in a two-dimensional space. 
It was found that the approach of using the state-
year pairs as the basic unit of analysis, originally 
introduced by Costea et al. (2001), very useful in 
mapping the time-dependent changes in the 
relative positions of the states. Future research 
should pay special attention to the implications 
of analyzing absolute variables and measures of 
change, which may have impacted the results of 
this analysis. 
In summary, this article provides an 
analysis of the socio-economic convergence of 
Eurasian states with the European Core. It 
demonstrates the usefulness of Kohonen maps as 
a tool for analyzing large sets of macroeconomic 
data over time. The study also distinguishes 
between economic and social factors, identifying 
much more proof of the former than the latter. 
This study identifies and reports indisputable 
evidence of economic convergence by European 
transition states that becomes less clear in 
countries farther to the east. It is argued that 
such convergence is either facilitated or 
constrained by preconditions that are either 
specific to each country or to a broader culture. 
This article lays the groundwork for further 
analysis of country-specific reforms and how 
they interact with initial conditions to impact 
convergence in the transition states. 
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